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Accounting for Peer Effects in Treatment Response

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Author Info

  • Rokhaya Dieye

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Université Laval)

  • Habiba Djebbari

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Université Laval)

  • Felipe Barrera-Osorio

    ()
    (Harvard Graduate School of Education, Harvard University)

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    Abstract

    When one’s treatment status affects the outcomes of others, experimental data are not sufficient to identify a treatment causal impact. In order to account for peer effects in program response, we use a social network model. We estimate and validate the model on experimental data collected for the evaluation of a scholarship program in Colombia. By design, randomization is at the student-level. Friendship data reveals that treated and untreated students interact together. Besides providing evidence of peer effects in schooling, we find that ignoring peer effects would have led us to overstate the program actual impact.

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    File URL: http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/files/_dt/2012/wp_2014_-_nr_35.pdf#overlay-context=fr/recherche/documents-de-travail/accounting-peer-effects-treatment-response
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France in its series AMSE Working Papers with number 1335.

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    Length: 47 pages
    Date of creation: Jul 2014
    Date of revision: Jul 2014
    Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1335

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    Web page: http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en
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    Related research

    Keywords: Education; social network; impact evaluation;

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