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Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Random Rules of Priority, Discrete Linear-Quadratic Model

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  • Daniel Hernández-Hernández

    (Research Center for Mathematics)

  • Joshué H. Ricalde-Guerrero

    (Research Center for Mathematics)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with zero-sum stochastic games with random rules of priority; this means that at each turn one of the players is randomly selected and will be able to see the decision of the other player, before his own action is chosen. We focus on the discrete linear-quadratic model, since its tractability allows us to obtain explicit expressions for the equilibrium strategies. These controls are expressed in terms of the parameters of the model and are adapted to the information available for both players in each turn. The dependence of the noise in the solution is also analysed. Finally, an example is implemented and explored through simulations in a program coded in Python.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Hernández-Hernández & Joshué H. Ricalde-Guerrero, 2022. "Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Random Rules of Priority, Discrete Linear-Quadratic Model," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1293-1311, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:12:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-021-00417-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00417-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & H?lya Eraslan, 2014. "Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2941-2974, October.
    5. SORIN, Sylvain, 1983. "Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for nonzero sum games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 553, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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