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Strategic information exchange

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  • Rosenberg, Dinah
  • Solan, Eilon
  • Vieille, Nicolas
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    Abstract

    We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided oneʼs initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 82 (2013)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 444-467

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:444-467

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

    Related research

    Keywords: Repeated games; Incomplete information on both sides; Information externalities; Folk Theorem; Equilibrium;

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    References

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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
    2. Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, . "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department 6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b, Penn Economics Department.
    3. Peski, Marcin, 2008. "Repeated games with incomplete information on one side," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
    4. Che,Y.-K. & Sakovics,J., 2001. "A dynamic theory of holdup," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 25, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    5. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
    6. Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, 03.
    7. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    8. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 975-1000.
    9. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    10. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May.
    11. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, 03.
    12. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July.
    13. Pitchford, Rohan & Snyder, Christopher M., 2004. "A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 88-103, January.
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