This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2007-09-24 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2007-09-24 (Game Theory)
• NEP-ICT-2007-09-24 (Information & Communication Technologies)

1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2004. "Best response equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 260-287, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Morris, Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2002. "Best Response Equivalence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1377, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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   • Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-22, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
   • Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-74, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
   • Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2001. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1237-59, September.
4. Cotter, Kevin D., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 48-68, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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   • Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2007. "Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000149, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Ehud Kalai, 2002. "Large Robust Games," Discussion Papers 1350, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
7. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
10. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, . "Hierarchies Of Belief And Interim Rationalizability," Discussion Papers 1388, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
11. FORGESÊ, Franoise, 1993. "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," CORE Discussion Papers 1993009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
12. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Abraham Neyman, 1997. "Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 223-227.
14. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Vaimaki, 2000. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1248, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1007-1033, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
16. Battigalli, P., 1999. "Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games," Economics Working Papers eco99/17, European University Institute.
17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
18. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001574, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1628, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 551-559, 04-05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]