Strategic learning in games with symmetric information
AbstractThis paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium paysoffs in termsof simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1998023.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 1998
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Public value of information; games with incomplete information; bandit problems.;
Other versions of this item:
- Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 25-47, January.
- O. Gossner & N. Vieille, 2000. "Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information," THEMA Working Papers 2000-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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