A General Class of Adaptive Strategies
AbstractWe exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan- consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no ``regret.'' Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine ) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell ) are particular cases. The motivation and application of the current paper come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. For the analysis we first develop a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 98 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Game Theory and Information 9904001, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A general class of adaptative strategies," Economics Working Papers 373, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
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