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Learning in Networks Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Eric Friedman () (Rutgers University)
Scott Shenker () (ICSI, Berkeley)
Amy Greenwald () (NYU)
This paper describes the results of simulation experiments performed on a suite of learning algorithms. We focus on games in {\em network contexts}. These are contexts in which (1) agents have very limited information about the game; users do not know their own (or any other agent's) payoff function, they merely observe the outcome of their play. (2) Play can be extremely asynchronous; players update their strategies at very different rates. There are many proposed learning algorithms in the literature. We choose a small sampling of such algorithms and use numerical simulation to explore the nature of asymptotic play. In particular, we explore the extent to which the asymptotic play depends on three factors, namely: limited information, asynchronous play, and the degree of responsiveness of the learning algorithm.
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Paper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
199825.
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Date of creation: 15 Oct 1998Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:199825Contact details of provider: Postal: New Jersey Hall - 75 Hamilton Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248 Phone: (732) 932-7482 Fax: (732) 932-7416 Web page: http://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/rutgers-wplist.html More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: learning ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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