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Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell

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  • Dean Foster
  • David K Levine
  • Rakesh Vohra

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  • Dean Foster & David K Levine & Rakesh Vohra, 1999. "Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2091, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:2091
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/0733a.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 2, pages 17-46, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. D. Blackwell, 2010. "An Analog of the Minmax Theorem for Vector Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 466, David K. Levine.
    4. D. Blackwell & L. Dubins, 2010. "Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 565, David K. Levine.
    5. Lehrer, Ehud, 2001. "Any Inspection Is Manipulable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1333-1347, September.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    7. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
    8. D. Foster & R. Vohra, 2010. "Asymptotic Calibration," Levine's Working Paper Archive 468, David K. Levine.
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