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Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium

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Author Info
Sergiu Hart
Andreu Mas-Colell

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 93 (2003)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1830-1836
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:5:p:1830-1836

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 1998. "On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 79-96, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    Other versions:
  6. Gaunersdorfer Andrea & Hofbauer Josef, 1995. "Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 279-303, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Saari, Donald G & Simon, Carl P, 1978. "Effective Price Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(5), pages 1097-1125, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 783, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Cartwright, Edward, 2003. "Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 684, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. H. Peyton Young, 2008. "Learning by Trial and Error," Economics Series Working Papers 384, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000369, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2004. "Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing," Economics Working Papers 788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dean P Foster & Peyton Young, 2006. "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000676, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2006. "The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001299, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp459, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
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