This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Uncoupled dynamics cannot lead to Nash equilibrium

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sergiu Hart ()
Andreu Mas-Colell ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We call a dynamical system uncoupled if the dynamic for each player does not depend on the payoffs of the other players. We show that there are no uncoupled dynamics that are guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium, even when the Nash equilibrium is unique.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/abs/uncoupl.html
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp299.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in American Economic Review, 2003, vol. 93, pp. 1830-1836.
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp299

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem
Phone: +972-2-6584135
Fax: +972-2-6513681
Email:
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ron Peretz).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
  5. Saari, Donald G & Simon, Carl P, 1978. "Effective Price Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(5), pages 1097-1125, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.