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Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium

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Author Info
Foster, Dean P.
Young, H. Peyton

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 45 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 73-96
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:73-96

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  1. Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory?," ESE Discussion Papers 153, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 783, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Joe Chen, 2005. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-359, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Gordon D. Menzies & Daniel John Zizzo, 2005. "Inferential Expectations," CAMA Working Papers 2005-12, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. H. Peyton Young, 2008. "Learning by Trial and Error," Economics Series Working Papers 384, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2004. "Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing," Economics Working Papers 788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. John H. Nachbar, 2003. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," ISER Discussion Paper 0597, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & Ed Hopkins, 2009. "Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," ESE Discussion Papers 188, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000609, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. H. Peyton Young, 2007. "The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 304, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2002. "Uncoupled dynamics cannot lead to Nash equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp299, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  12. Dean P Foster & Peyton Young, 2006. "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000676, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  13. Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2006. "The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001299, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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