On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 25 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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