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On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games

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  • Foster, Dean P.
  • Young, H. Peyton

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45S4PJS-3/2/dbae6fb8419129e69fb9e57e8ce2f509
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 25 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 79-96

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:1:p:79-96

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Cited by:
  1. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
  2. Juan Enrique Martinez-Legaz & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "Learning from Errors," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 557.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Berger, Ulrich, 2007. "Brown's original fictitious play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 572-578, July.
  4. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Some Notes on Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Game Theory and Information 0409001, EconWPA.
  5. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property," Game Theory and Information 0408003, EconWPA.
  6. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December.
  7. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Bryan McCannon, 2011. "Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 263-273, April.
  9. Y.M. Ermoliev & S.D. Flam, 1997. "Learning in Potential Games," Working Papers ir97022, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
  10. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Fictitious play in 2xn games," Game Theory and Information 0303009, EconWPA.
  11. Berger, Ulrich, 2007. "Two more classes of games with the continuous-time fictitious play property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 247-261, August.

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