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Learning and Implementation on the Internet

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Author Info

  • Eric Friedman

    ()
    (Rutgers University)

  • Scott Shenker

    ()
    (ICSI, Berkeley)

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    Abstract

    We address the problem of learning and implementation on the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed environments like the Internet, they have very limited {\em a priori} information about the other players and the payoff matrix, and the play can be highly asynchronous. Consequently, standard solution concepts like Nash equilibria, or even the serially undominated set, do not apply in such a setting. To construct more appropriate solution concepts, we first describe the essential properties that constitute ``reasonable'' learning behavior in distributed environments. We then study the convergence behavior of such algorithms; these results lead us to propose rather non traditional solutions concepts for this context. Finally, we discuss implementation of social choice functions with these solution concepts.

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    File URL: ftp://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/1998-21.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 199821.

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    Date of creation: 23 Sep 1998
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:199821

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    Related research

    Keywords: Implementation; Internet; Learning;

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    References

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    19. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
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    21. E. Maskin, 1983. "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey," Working papers 333, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Yan Chen & Laura Razzolini & Theodore Turocy, 2007. "Congestion allocation for distributed networks: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 121-143, October.
    2. Huck Steffen & Sarin Rajiv, 2004. "Players With Limited Memory," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, September.
    3. Kumar, Rajnish, 2013. "Secure implementation in production economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 372-378.
    4. Friedman, Eric J., 2002. "Strategic properties of heterogeneous serial cost sharing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 145-154, November.
    5. Chen, Yan & Khoroshilov, Yuri, 2003. "Learning under limited information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-25, July.

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