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Belief Affirming in Learning Processes

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Author Info
Dov Monderer
Dov Samet
Aner Sela
Abstract

A learning process is belief affirming if for each player, the difference between her expected payoff in the next period, and the average of her past payoffs converges to zero. We show that every smooth discrete fictitious play and every continuous fictitious play is belief affirming. We also provide conditions under which general averaging processes are belief affirming.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9408002.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 1994
Date of revision: 11 Aug 1994
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9408002

Note: 14 p. AmS TeX. (for a PostScript file call samet@vm.tau.ac il).
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998. "Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2138, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 470, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.


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