Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria

Author Info

Ellison, Glenn
Fudenberg, Drew

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 90 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 84-115
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:84-115

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000609, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000547, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Ed Hopkins & Josef Hofbauer & Michel Benaim, 2005. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," ESE Discussion Papers 135, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory?," ESE Discussion Papers 153, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-30, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000724, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
repec:att:wimass:1920321 is not listed on IDEAS
repec:att:wimass:192005 is not listed on IDEAS
N. Williams, 2002. "Stability and Long Run Equilibrium in Stochastic Fictitious Play," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers cbeeeb49cc8afc83f125df5a8, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000226, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
- Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2005. "Learning in perturbed asymmetric games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-152, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Friederike Mengel, 2007. "Learning Across Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
Nicole Marie Bouchez, 2001. "What Learning Models Tell Us to Expect in Three-by-Three Bimatrix Games," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 00/3, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2001. [Downloadable!]
Ed Hopkins & Martin Posch, 2003. "Attainability of Boundary Points under Reinforcement Learning," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ed Hopkins & Martin Posch, 2004. "Attainability of Boundary Points under Reinforcement Learning," ESE Discussion Papers 79, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
- Hopkins, Ed & Posch, Martin, 2005. "Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 110-125, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Federico Echenique & Aaron Edlin, 2001. "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000161, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Federico Echenique & Aaron Edlin, 2003. "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable," Game Theory and Information 0303003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Federico Echenique & Aaron Edlin, 2002. "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1037, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.