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Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play

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  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Satoru Takahashi

Abstract

Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000001695.

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Date of creation: 31 Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001695

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ratul, Lahkar, 2011. "The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1796-1827, September.
  2. Lahkar, Ratul & Seymour, Robert M., 2013. "Reinforcement learning in population games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 10-38.
  3. Mohlin, Erik, 2012. "Evolution of theories of mind," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 299-318.

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