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Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules

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  • Russell Golman

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  • Scott Page

    ()

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00191-009-0136-x
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Evolutionary Economics.

    Volume (Year): 20 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 49-72

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:20:y:2010:i:1:p:49-72

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    Related research

    Keywords: Adjustment dynamics; Attainability; Basins of attraction; Best response dynamics; Coordination game; Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game; Learning; Replicator dynamics; C73;

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    References

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    1. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
    2. Swinkels Jeroen M., 1993. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 455-484, July.
    3. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 363-93, April.
    4. Bernard Walliser, 1998. "A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 67-87.
    5. J. Hofbauer & P. Schuster & K. Sigmund, 2010. "A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 441, David K. Levine.
    6. Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
    7. Ed Hopkins, . "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," ESE Discussion Papers 3, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    8. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
    9. Ellison, Glenn, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45, January.
    10. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
    11. P. Allen & M. Strathern & J. Baldwin, 2007. "Complexity and the limits to learning," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 401-431, August.
    12. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    13. Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, December.
    14. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-67, May.
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    Cited by:
    1. Page, Scott E. & Tassier, Troy, 2010. "A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1229-1242, November.
    2. Golman, Russell & Page, Scott E., 2010. "Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 359-376, March.

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