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Nested potentials and robust equilibria

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  • UNO, Hiroshi

    () (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

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    Abstract

    This paper introduces the notion of nested best-response potentials for complete in- formation games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).

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    File URL: http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2011_9web.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2011009.

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    Date of creation: 01 Feb 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2011009

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    Related research

    Keywords: incomplete information; potential games; robustness; refinements;

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    References

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    1. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2009. "Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1726-1769, July.
    2. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    3. David Veredas & Luc Bauwens & Winfried Pohlmeier, 2008. "High frequency financial econometrics: recent developments," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/6500, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    6. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2004. "Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 94-110, July.
    7. Tercieux, Olivier, 2006. "p-Best response set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 45-70, November.
    8. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2010. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521681599, May.
    9. Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2006. "Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 77-94, January.
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