Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Potential games in volatile environments

Contents:

Author Info

  • Staudigl, Mathias

Abstract

This paper studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the context of finite population potential games. Action revision, link creation and link destruction are combined in a continuous-time Markov process. I derive the unique invariant distribution of this process in closed form, as well as the marginal distribution over action profiles and the conditional distribution over networks. It is shown that the equilibrium interaction topology is an inhomogeneous random graph. Furthermore, a characterization of the set of stochastically stable states is provided, generalizing existing results to models with endogenous interaction structures.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-50VTWMD-1/2/c8dbb07b92c51c0c26ab626ad20aae64
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 72 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 271-287

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:271-287

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords: Markov process Potential game Stochastic stability Network co-evolution Random graphs;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  2. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2003. "Network Formation and Social Coordination," Working Papers 481, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  3. Carlos Alos-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2008. "The Logit-Response Dynamics," TWI Research Paper Series 28, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  4. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2007. "Complex Social Networks," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521674096, April.
  5. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  6. Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2003. "Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1394, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 47-69, January.
  8. Mathias Staudigl, 2010. "On a General class of stochastic co-evolutionary dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 1001, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  9. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  10. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  11. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  12. Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 367-382, January.
  13. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2003. "A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 286-301, December.
  14. Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2000. "On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0778, Econometric Society.
  15. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
  16. Mathias Staudigl, 2013. "Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 179-210, February.
  17. George Ehrhardt & Matteo Marsili & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2008. "Networks Emerging in a Volatile World," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/08, European University Institute.
  18. Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2006. "Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 112-130, April.
  19. Ui, Takashi, 2001. "Robust Equilibria of Potential Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1373-80, September.
  20. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2007. "Complex Social Networks," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521857406, April.
  21. Ui, Takashi, 2000. "A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 121-135, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mathias Staudigl & Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination," Vienna Economics Papers 1004, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  2. Lee, Lung-Fei & Liu, Xiaodong & Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves, 2011. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Zenou, Yves & König, Michael D. & Tessone, Claudio J., 0. "Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  4. Pongou, Roland & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies," MPRA Paper 46021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Volume of Trade and Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies," Working Papers 2013-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Hellmann, Tim & Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "Evolution of social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 583-596.
  7. Mathias Staudigl, 2010. "On a General class of stochastic co-evolutionary dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 1001, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  8. Mathias Staudigl, 2013. "Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 179-210, February.
  9. Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(4), pages 551-585, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:271-287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.