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On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games

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  • Matthew O. Jackson

    (California Technical Institute)

  • Alison Watts

    (Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions. We examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play. We model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other players. A player chooses whether to add or sever a link based on the (prospective) partner's past behavior. With such endogenous interaction patterns we see multiple stochastically stable states of play, including some that involve play of equilibria in the coordination game that are neither efficient nor risk dominant.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0778.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0778

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  1. Edward Droste & Robert P. Gilles & Cathleen Johnson, 2000. "Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 0594, Econometric Society.
  2. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  3. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, 1994. "Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 117-131, Spring.
  4. Ellison, G., 1996. "Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 96-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  6. J. Bergin & B. Lipman, 2010. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 486, David K. Levine.
  7. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  8. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  9. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1997. "Endogenous Interactions," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences endo-one, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  10. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2002. "Local Conventions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1349, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  12. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1994. "Systems Competition and Network Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 93-115, Spring.
  13. Ely Jeffrey C, 2002. "Local Conventions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, May.
  14. S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, 1994. "Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 133-150, Spring.
  15. Ellison, Glenn, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45, January.
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