(Weak) Correlation and Sunspots in Duopoly
AbstractFor duopoly models, we consider the notion of weak correlation using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nashcentric devices involving a sunspot structure are simple symmetric weak correlated equilibria. Any small perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 11-14.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Duopoly; weak Correlation; Simple device; Sunspots;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-09-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2011-09-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2011-09-22 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Forges, Francoise & Peck, James, 1995.
"Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium,"
Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-50, January.
- Abraham Neyman, 1997. "Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 223-227.
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