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Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games

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Author Info

  • Georg Kirchsteiger
  • Werner Güth
  • Klaus Ritzberger

Abstract

In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/5907.

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Date of creation: Apr 1998
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Publication status: Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (1998) v.23 n° 1,p.54-74
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/5907

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References

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  1. Damme, E.E.C. van & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1997. "Games with imperfectly observable commitment," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-74216, Tilburg University.
  2. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
  3. Ritzberger, Klaus, 1994. "The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 207-36.
  4. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
  2. Tanja Hörtnagl & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2014. "How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck 2014-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  3. Blundell,Richard & Newey,Whitney K. & Persson,Torsten (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521692083.
  4. Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.
  5. V. Bhaskar, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics 596, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  6. Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. " Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 319-47, March.
  7. Oechssler, Jörg & Schlag, Karl H., 1997. "Loss of commitment? An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1997,39, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  8. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2000. "Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 174-190, May.
  9. Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007. "The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August.
  10. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December.
  11. Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2004. "An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 401-423, November.
  12. Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9704001, EconWPA, revised 11 Apr 1997.

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