1. Levine, David K. & Martinelli, Cesar, 1998. "Reputation with Noisy Precommitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 55-75, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli, 1997. "Reputation with Noisy Precommitment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1987, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Amnon Rapoport, 1997. "Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 113-136.
4. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 282-308, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Guth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 54-74, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Werner GÜTH & Georg KIRCHSTEIGER & Klaus RITZBERGER, 1995. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Vienna Economics Papers vie9507, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
   • Gueth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1996. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Economics Series 35, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
6. W. Güth & S. Huck & W. Müller, . "The relevance of equal splits - On behavioral discontinuity in ultimatum games," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1998-7, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.

Cited by:
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1. Huck, Steffen & Mueller, Wieland & Norman, Hans-Theo, 2000. "Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • S. Huck & W. Müller & H. Normann, . "Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2000-39, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
   • Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2004. "Strategic delegation in experimental markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 561-574, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Jordi Brandts & Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2003. "Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 15-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jordi Brandts & Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2003. "Forward Induction and the Excess Capacity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation," Economics Working Papers 703, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
   • Jordi Brandts & Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2003. "Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000253, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Jordi Brandts & Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2003. "Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 586.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
3. Robert Ritz, 2005. "Strategic incentives for market share," Economics Series Working Papers 248, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Muller, W. & Fischer, S. & Guth, W. & Stiehler, A., 2003. "From ultimatum to nash bargaining: theory and experimental evidence," Discussion Paper 41, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller, . "From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
   • Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler, 2006. "From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 17-33, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. V. Bhaskar, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 596, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Werner Güth & Gerlinde Fellner, 2002. "Putting Limits to Emotional Behavior - An Ultimatum Experiment Varying Threat Efficiency," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-04, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
7. Eyal Ert & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Noisy commitments: The impact of information accuracy on efficiency," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_4, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
8. Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. " Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 319-47, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer & Marc Knez, 2004. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link†Coordination Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 25-48, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Dorothea Alewell & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Wage Differentials, Fairness, and Social Comparison: An experimental study of the Co-Employment of Permanent and Temporary Agency Workers†," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_8, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
11. Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, . "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi, 2006. "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 37-62, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007. "The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)