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Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study

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Author Info

  • Schotter, A.
  • Sopher, B.

Abstract

This is a paper on the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "inter-generational games". In these games a sequence of nonoverlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t are allowed to see the history of the game played by all (or some subset) of the generations who played it before them and can communicate with their successors in generation t+1 and advise them on how they should behave. What we find is that word-of-mouth social learning (in the form of advice from laboratory "parents" to laboratory "children") can be a strong force in the creation of social conventions, far stronger than the type of learning subjects seem capable of doing simply by learning the lessons of history without the guidance o¥ered by such advice.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 01-10.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:01-10

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
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Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Cited by:
  1. Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 2004. "Dynamic Analysis of the Evolution of Conventions in a Public Goods Experiment with Intergenerational Advice," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 37, Econometric Society.
  2. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Abigail Barr & Pieter Serneels, 2004. "Wages and Reciprocity in the Workplace," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2004-18, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Charness, Gary & Schram, Arthur, 2012. "Social and Moral Norms in the Laboratory," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6rv7x0tf, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  5. Catherine Eckel & Rick Wilson, 2007. "Social learning in coordination games: does status matter?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 317-329, September.
  6. Kuang, Xi (Jason) & Weber, Roberto A. & Dana, Jason, 2007. "How effective is advice from interested parties?: An experimental test using a pure coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 591-604, April.
  7. Gehrig, Thomas & Güth, Werner & Leví0nský, René & Popova, Vera, 2010. "On the evolution of professional consulting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 113-126, October.
  8. Sugden, Robert, 2011. "Salience, inductive reasoning and the emergence of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 35-47.
  9. Andrew Schotter & Barry Sopher, 2006. "Trust and trustworthiness in games: An experimental study of intergenerational advice," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 123-145, June.
  10. Duffy, John & Kim, Minseong, 2005. "Anarchy in the laboratory (and the role of the state)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 297-329, March.
  11. Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 75-98, March.
  12. Guala, Francesco & Mittone, Luigi, 2010. "How history and convention create norms: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 749-756, August.
  13. Omar Al-Ubaydli, 2009. "How Large Looms the Ghost of the Past? State-Dependence vs. Heterogeneity in the Stag Hunt," Working Papers 1010, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.

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