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A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players

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Salant, David J.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 3 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 244-259
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:244-259

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  1. Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2000. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers 00-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Martin Gaynor, 1995. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 4695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 01-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labour Income Taxation and Education Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2326, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Panu Poutvaara, 2002. "Gerontocracy Revisited: Unilateral Transfer to the Young May Benefit the Middle-aged," VATT Discussion Papers 275, Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT). [Downloadable!]
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  8. Kiho Yoon, 2001. "An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 736-745, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters and Harry A.A. Verbon, 1999. "Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-019/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Political Equilibria with Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 41-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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