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Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

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Author Info
Chaudhuri, A.
Schotter, A.
Sopher, B.

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-11.PDF
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 01-11.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:01-11

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Shotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001. "Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach," Working Papers 01-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In Coordination Games," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  8. Bryant, John, 1983. "A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 525-28, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 2004. "Dynamic Analysis of the Evolution of Conventions in a Public Goods Experiment with Intergenerational Advice," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 37, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, . "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Laura Bangun & Ananish Chaudhuri & Parapin Prak & Chenan Zhou, 2006. "Common and almost common knowledge of credible assignments in a coordination game," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(1), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2005. "It's What You Say Not What You Pay," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 643.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  7. Andrew Schotter & Barry Sopher, 2006. "Trust and trustworthiness in games: An experimental study of intergenerational advice," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 123-145, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Andrew Schotter, 2003. "Decision Making with Naive Advice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 196-201, May. [Downloadable!]
  9. Howard Margolis, 2005. "Cognitive Anomalies and Experimental Economics," Working Papers 0502, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  10. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory," CEEL Working Papers 0605, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. C. Mónica Capra & Tomomi Tanaka, 2006. "Communication and the extraction of natural renewable resources with threshold externalities," Emory Economics 0602, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
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