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Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism

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Author Info
Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University)
Akihiko Matsui (University of Tokyo)

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Abstract

This paper studies the role of memory and communication in games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the same preferences and faces the same strategic possibilities. Entry across distinct organizations are asynchronous: no two individuals alive at a date t have entered at the same time. We model these as repeated games between overlapping generations of individuals (OLG games). It has been shown elsewhere that Folk Theorems hold in OLG games with long enough lived individuals who can perfectly observe the past. However, the Folk Theorem fails for many games when individuals have no prior memory, i.e., no individual can witness events that occur before his entry into the game. We examine OLG games without prior memory. We then examine such games when the past can be communicated by one generation to the next through ``cheap talk" communication. With costly communication, an approximate Folk Theorem holds only when there is some altruistic link between cohorts in an organization. The equilibria in this Folk Theorem require a special form of intergenerational sanctions. In these sanctions, punishment is sometimes carried out long after both victim and perpetrator have left the game. Without this special structure, altruism may in fact destroy cooperation when it would otherwise be possible.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0103002.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 04 Apr 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0103002

Note: Type of Document - LaTex/pdf ; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 28 ; figures: included. We have benefitted from helpful comments and conversations with Luca Anderlini, Hans Haller, and Takashi Shimizu. This research is partially supported by grants-in-aid for scientific research of the Ministry of Education of Japan.
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Organizations; Overlapping Generations Games; Memory; Communication; Altruism.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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  1. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, . "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. A. Muthoo & K. A. Shepsle, 2003. "Agenda Setting Power in Organizations With Overlapping Generations of Players," Economics Discussion Papers 553, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Roger Lagunoff & Dino Gerardi & Luca Anderlini, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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