Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games

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Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games

Author Info

Hans Haller (Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University)
Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Roger Lagunoff

Abstract

This paper examines Markov Perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the alternating move game.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9901003.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 27 Jan 1999
Date of revision: 03 Jun 1999
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9901003

Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf file; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX; to print on Acrobat PDF Writer; pages: 25 ; figures: included.
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Article
- Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1231-1248, September.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-1999-02-15 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-1999-02-15 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III : Cournot competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 947-968, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robert Anderson & William Zame, 2001. "Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(advances/), pages 1003-1003. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-71, March.
Other versions:
- Govindan, S & McLennan, A, 1997. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Papers 299, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
J. Tirole & E. Maskin, 1982. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large-Fixed Costs," Working papers 320, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-69, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters,Ronald J.A.P., 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games," Research Memoranda 009, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- P.Jean-Jacques Herings & Ronald J.A.P. Peeters, 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games," Game Theory and Information 0205002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
Ulrich Doraszelski & Mark Satterthwaite, 2007. "Computable Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000912, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Ulrich Doraszelski & Mark Satterthwaite, 2003. "Foundations of Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics. Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity," Discussion Papers 1383, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Doraszelski, Ulrich & Satterthwaite, Mark, 2007. "Computable Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity," CEPR Discussion Papers 6212, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games," Wallis Working Papers WP37, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 309-329, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peeters,Ronald & Schinkel,Maarten Pieter & Herings,P. Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Intertemporal Market Divison," Research Memoranda 011, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000560, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roger Lagunoff & Hans Haller, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Game Theory and Information 9707006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters,Ronald J.A.P, 2000. "Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games: Structure, Selection, and Computation," Research Memoranda 004, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald J. A. P., 2004. "Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 32-60, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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