Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?
AbstractFolk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of games which contains a pure coordination game such that every Perfect equilibrium of every game in the neighborhood approximates to an arbitrary degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9906001.
Date of creation: 03 Jun 1999
Date of revision: 03 Jun 1999
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf file; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on Acrobat PDF Writer;
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://188.8.131.52
repeated games; asynchronously repeated games; renewal games; coordination games;
Other versions of this item:
- Akihiko Matsui & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric?," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 397-412.
- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2000. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0894, Econometric Society.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-06-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-1999-06-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-1999-06-23 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2010.
"A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 1: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
397, David K. Levine.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-69, May.
- J. Tirole & E. Maskin, 1982. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large-Fixed Costs," Working papers 320, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, . ""An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games''," CARESS Working Papres 95-15, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III : Cournot competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 947-968, June.
- Dutta, Prajit K., 2012. "Coordination need not be a problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 519-534.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November.
- Quan Wen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Asynchronous Moves," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0204, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.