Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters
AbstractIn this paper I examine single member, simple plurality elections with n > 2 probabilistic voters and show that the maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory are “generically different” in a specific sense. More specifically, I first describe finite shyness (Anderson and Zame (2000)), a notion of genericity for infinite dimensional spaces. Using this notion, I show that, for any policy x in the interior of the policy space and any candidate j, the set of n-dimensional profiles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic voting functions for which x simultaneously satisfies the first and second order conditions for maximization of j’s probability of victory and j’s expected vote share at x is finitely shy with respect to the set of n-dimensional profiles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic voting functions for which x satisfies the first and second order conditions for maximization of j’s expected vote share.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0502006.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 16 Feb 2005
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
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Equivalence; Genericity; Candidate objectives; Probabilistic voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-16 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hinich, Melvin J., 1977.
"Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December.
- Hinich, M., 1976. "Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result is an Artifact," Working Papers 119, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Anderson Robert M. & Zame William R., 2001. "Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-64, February.
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