"An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games''
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences in its series CARESS Working Papres with number 95-15.
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- Eric Friedman, 1998. "Learnability of a class of Non-atomic Games arising on the Internet," Departmental Working Papers 199824, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Gale, Douglas, 2001. "Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 295-320, November.
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- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?," Game Theory and Information 9906001, EconWPA, revised 03 Jun 1999.
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"Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data,"
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- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games,"
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- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2012. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Eric Friedman & Scott Shenker, 1998. "Learning and Implementation on the Internet," Departmental Working Papers 199821, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- E. Friedman & S. Shenker, 2010. "Synchronous and Asynchronous Learning by Responsive Learning Automata," Levine's Working Paper Archive 469, David K. Levine.
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