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Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games

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  • Haller, Hans
  • Lagunoff, Roger

Abstract

This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of Markov Perfect equilibria in alternating move repeated games. Such games are canonical models of environments with repeated, asynchronous choices due to inertia or replacement. Our main result is that the number of Markov Perfect equilibria is generically finite with respect to stage game payoffs. This holds despite the fact that the stochastic game representation of the alternating move repeated game is "non-generic" in the larger space of state dependent payoffs. We further obtain that the set of completely mixed Markov Perfect equilibria is generically empty with respect to stage game payoffs.

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  • Haller, Hans & Lagunoff, Roger, 2010. "Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1103-1114, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:6:p:1103-1114
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    Cited by:

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    2. V. Bhaskar & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998. "Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria:Theoretical Foundations and Applications," Game Theory and Information 9809003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2010. "Global dynamics in repeated games with additively separable payoffs," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 899-918, October.
    4. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2006. "Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 199, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    5. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2007. "Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 210, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    6. Sibdari, Soheil & Pyke, David F., 2014. "Dynamic pricing with uncertain production cost: An alternating-move approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(1), pages 218-228.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated games Asynchronous choice Alternating moves Stochastic games Markov Perfect equilibria Genericity;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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