Global Dynamics in Repeated Games with Additively Separable Payoffs
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- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2010. "Global dynamics in repeated games with additively separable payoffs," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 899-918, October.
References listed on IDEAS
- Taiji Furusawa, 2001. "Threats and Concessions in Tariff Settings," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-123, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Haller, Hans & Lagunoff, Roger, 2010.
"Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1103-1114, November.
- Roger Lagunoff & Hans Haller, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Game Theory and Information 9707006, EconWPA.
- Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000560, UCLA Department of Economics.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Taiji Furusawa & Takashi Kamihigashi, 2012.
"Threats Or Promises? A Built-In Mechanism Of Gradual Reciprocal Trade Liberalization,"
The Japanese Economic Review,
Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 259-279, June.
- Taiji Furusawa & Takashi Kamihigashi, 2011. "Threats or Promises? A Built-in Mechanism of Gradual Reciprocal Trade Liberalization," Discussion Paper Series DP2011-27, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Jan 2012.
- Takashi Kamihigashi, 2014.
"Elementary results on solutions to the bellman equation of dynamic programming: existence, uniqueness, and convergence,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 251-273, June.
- Takashi Kamihigashi, 2012. "Elementary Results on Solutions to the Bellman Equation of Dynamic Programming: Existence, Uniqueness, and Convergence," Discussion Paper Series DP2012-31, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Takashi Kamihigashi, 2013. "Elementary Results on Solutions to the Bellman Equation of Dynamic Programming:Existence, Uniqueness, and Convergence," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-35, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Dec 2013.
More about this item
KeywordsImmediately reactive equilibria; Additively separable payoffs; Kinked demand; Gradual cooperation; Prisoners' dilemma;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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