1. Stahl, Dale II, 1991. "The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 368-384, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Sorin, Sylvain, 1992. "Repeated games with complete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 650, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Haag, Matthew & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 97, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Game Theory and Information 0209005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers 2003.54, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Wallis Working Papers WP33, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000043, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1999. "Collective Action and Group Size Paradox," Papers 23, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza.
5. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 378-393, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, And Neighborhood Planning ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 265-296, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2049, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning," Game Theory and Information 9907004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
9. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M & Maskin, Eric S, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(4), pages 555-73, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 608, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
12. Ehud Lehrer & Ady Pauzner, 1999. "Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 393-412, March.
13. Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 99-122, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • George J. Mailath & Ichiro Obara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, . "The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Penn CARESS Working Papers 83719e84b6825736ffcfdfacb, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
14. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "Collusion among asymmetric firms: The case of different discount factors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 289-307, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Haag, Matthew & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 97, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Game Theory and Information 0209005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers 2003.54, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Wallis Working Papers WP33, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000043, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 650, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 337-346, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Andrea Galeotti & Miguel Meléndez, 2004. "Exploitation and Cooperation in Networks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-076/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]