Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 31 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger D., 1995. "Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 245-261, December.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
- Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997.
"On the Social Stability of Coalitional Property Rights Regimes,"
Game Theory and Information
- Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1999. "On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 409-427.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Schofield, Norman., 1985.
"Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point,"
552, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Roger Lagunoff, 1997.
"Sufficiently Specialized Economies Have Nonempty Cores,"
Game Theory and Information
- Roger D. Lagunoff, . ""Sufficiently Specialized Economies have Nonempty Cores''," CARESS Working Papres 95-07, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
- Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
- Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
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