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The folk theorem revisited

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  • James Bergin

Abstract

This paper develops a simple “instant-response” model of strategic behavior where players can react instantly to changing circumstances, but at the same time face some inertia after changing action. The framework is used to reconsider the folk theorem and, in particular, the role of the key condition of dimensionality. In contrast to the discounted case in discrete time, here low dimensionality may help support equilibria because it is more difficult for a potential deviator or punisher to defect beneficially. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Suggested Citation

  • James Bergin, 2006. "The folk theorem revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(2), pages 321-332, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:321-332
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0580-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December.
    2. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Mitri Kitti, 2018. "Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 120, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    4. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kern, Johannes, 2015. "Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 34-57.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Instant response; Folk theorem.;

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