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Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives

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Radner, Roy
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 22 (1980)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 136-154
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:22:y:1980:i:2:p:136-154

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  1. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. In Lee, 1999. "Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 115-134, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. David Levine, 2006. "EconomicDynamics Interviews David Levine on Experimental Economics," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(2), April. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-179, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  5. Justin Smith, 1999. "Strategic Cost and ‘Matching Pennies’," Working Papers 99-07-048, Santa Fe Institute.
  6. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Lasse H. Pedersen & Markus Brunnermeier, 2004. "Predatory Trading," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 425, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 668, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1984. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms," NBER Working Papers 1412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Sujoy Mukerji & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1011-1011. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Ian Domowitz & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 1988. "Business Cycles and Oligopoly Supergames: Some Empirical Evidence on Prices and Margins," NBER Working Papers 2057, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
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