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Interconnected games and international environmental problems

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Author Info
Henk Folmer
Pierre Mouche
Shannon Ragland
Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of interconnected games and to show its relevance for modeling international environmental problems. It is argued that an interconnected game approach to international environmental problems may enhance cooperation and provide an alternative to the use of financial side payments to induce countries to cooperate. Two types of interconnected games are distinguished in this paper, i.e. direct sum games and tensor games. In the former all the constituting isolated games are games in strategic form and in the latter they are repeated games. In both cases the interconnected game can be interpreted as a multiple objective game, but only the setting where a trade-off is made for the vector-payoffs is considered. In addition to the formal definition of these types of interconnected games, some elementary results concerning Nash equilibria of such games are derived. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993

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Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 313-335
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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:3:y:1993:i:4:p:313-335

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Keywords: Game theory repeated games multiple objective games tensor games environmental economics economic modeling

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Markusen, James R, 1975. "Cooperative Control of International Pollution and Common Property Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 618-32, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Veijo Kaitala & Matti Pohjola & Olli Tahvonen, 1992. "Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 161-181, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Henk Folmer & Charles Howe, 1991. "Environmental problems and policy in the Single European Market," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(1), pages 17-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Zhao, Jingang, 1991. "The Equilibria of a Multiple Object Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 171-82.
  5. Barrett, Scott, 1990. "The Problem of Global Environmental Protection," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 68-79, Spring.
  6. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hansen, Stein, 1989. "Debt for nature swaps -- Overview and discussion of key issues," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 77-93, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo & Cersosimo, Igor & Marchiori, Carmen, 2002. "Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage Between R&D and Climate Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Carlo Carraro & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2007. "A stochastic multiple players multi-issues bargaining model for the Piave river basin," Working Papers 2007_28, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Xiaodong Wu, 2000. ""Pollution Havens" and the Regulation of Multinationals by Multiple Governments," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1766, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005. "Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3642, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Alessandra Sgobbi & Carlo Carraro, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2007.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Norimichi Matsueda, 2004. "Potential Failure of an International Environmental Agreement under Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series 22, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2007. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Working Papers 2007.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  8. Xiaodong Wu, 2004. "Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(2), pages 1265-1265. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Antonio Rangel, 2000. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange," NBER Working Papers 7518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Scott Barret, 1998. "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 317-333, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Pauwels, Wilfried, 2007. "Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies?," MPRA Paper 3584, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Pierre von Mouche & Henk Folmer, 2007. "Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?," Working Papers 2007.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  13. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Nina Maderner, 2001. "Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 343-360, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Stavins, Robert & Jaffe, Adam & Newell, Richard, 2004. "A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers dp-04-38, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Charles Howe, 1993. "The U.S. Environmental policy experience: A critique with Suggestions for the European Community," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 359-379, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Luciano Mendez & Rafael Trelles, 2000. "The Abatement Market A Proposal for Environmental Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 16(1), pages 15-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Carsten Helm, 1998. "International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty – The Case of Transboundary Acidification," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(2), pages 185-201, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Frank Stähler, 1996. "On International compensations for environmental stocks," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(1), pages 1-13, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. David M. McEvoy & John K. Stranlund, 2006. "Enforcing ‘Self-Enforcing’ International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2006-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
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