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Finance and Governance in Developing Economies

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  • Randall Morck

    (Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada T6E 2T9, and National Bureau of Economic Research)

Abstract

Classic Big Push industrialization envisions state planners coordinating economic activity to internalize a range of externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful Big Push coordination may occur instead when a large business group, acting in its controlling shareholder's self-interest, coordinates the establishment and expansion of businesses in diverse sectors. Where business groups play this role, many basic axioms of Anglo-American corporate governance, including the advocacy of shareholder value maximization and contestable corporate control, must be qualified.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:refeco:v:3:y:2011:p:375-406
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Big Push; business groups; family firms; network externalities; rent seeking; public choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O25 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy
    • P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

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