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On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion

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Author Info
Spagnolo, Giancarlo

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 89 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 127-139
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:89:y:1999:i:1:p:127-139

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993. " Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1629-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. McCutcheon, Barbara, 1997. "Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 330-50, April.
  3. Stulz, Ren? M., 1984. "Optimal Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(02), pages 127-140, June. [Downloadable!]
  4. Geczy, Christopher & Minton, Bernadette A & Schrand, Catherine, 1997. " Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1323-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, 1994. "CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures," NBER Working Papers 4976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  7. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F. & Sloan, Richard G., 1995. "Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 29-74, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Smith, Clifford W. & Stulz, Ren? M., 1985. "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(04), pages 391-405, December. [Downloadable!]
  12. Gaver, Jennifer J. & Gaver, Kenneth M. & Austin, Jeffrey R., 1995. "Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 3-28, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1995. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 75-93, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. DeFond, Mark L. & Park, Chul W., 1997. "Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 115-139, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. R. Glenn Hubbard & Anil K Kashyap & Toni M. Whited, 1995. "Internal Finance and Firm Investment," NBER Working Papers 4392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Working Papers 95-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1993. "Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Healy, Paul M., 1985. "The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 85-107, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Stulz, ReneM., 1990. "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-27, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1988-1), pages 141-206. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Asymmetric Information and the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 160-65, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Blume Andreas, 1994. "Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 181-211, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Giancarlo Spagnolo & Steffen Lippert, 2004. "Networks of Relations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 496, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Globalization and Cooperative Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3522, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Networks of Relations and Social Capital," CEPR Discussion Papers 5078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2009. "Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Nuno Limão, 2002. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," International Trade 0206002, EconWPA, revised 28 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Suchan Chae & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-24, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. John R. Conlon, 2005. "Seemingly Unrelated Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Luis M. B. Cabral, 2003. "An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy," Working Papers 03-25, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Lucio Fuentelsaz & Jaime Gómez, . "Multipoint Competition, Mutual Forbearance and Entry into Geographic Markets," Studies on the Spanish Economy 127, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
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