The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games: A New Condition
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 299.
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
game theory ; economic models;
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- Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997.
"Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
633, David K. Levine.
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