A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games
AbstractLet Gamma be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Gamma ^infinity (delta) and G^infinity (delta) be the infinitely repeated game version of Gamma and G respectively, with common discount factor delta. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of Gamma^infinity (delta) might be different from that of G sub infinity (delta), even when delta is arbitrarily close to 1. This difference can be substantial when G fails to satisfy the "dimensionality" condition (a-la Fundenberg and Masking (1986) or Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1992)).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 989.
Date of creation: Aug 1992
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013.
"Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis,"
Annals of Economics and Finance,
Society for AEF, vol. 14(3), pages 627-640, December.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986.
"Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
- Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.