A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 293.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
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- David Levine, 2000.
"The Castle on the Hill,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 330-337, April.
- David K Levine & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2127, David K. Levine.
- Marco Celentani & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1992.
"Reputation in Dynamic Games,"
1009, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997.
"Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
633, David K. Levine.
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