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An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information

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  • D. Fudenberg
  • D. K. Levine

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 607.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1991
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:607

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References

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  1. Lehrer, E, 1990. "Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 191-217.
  2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
  3. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January.
  5. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
  6. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
  8. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 676, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. George J. Stigler, 1961. "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 213.
  10. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987. "On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  12. D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 608, David K. Levine.
  13. Lehrer Ehud & Monderer Dov, 1994. "Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 97-113, January.
  14. Ehud Lehrer, 1988. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 800, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Radner, Roy, 1981. "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1127-48, September.
  16. Radner, Roy, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57, January.
  17. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1998. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 224, David K. Levine.
  18. Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-98, September.
  19. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 651-669, August.
  2. Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  3. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
  4. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1482, Econometric Society.
  5. Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  6. Verboven, F., 1995. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1995-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Frank Verboben, 1997. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) FS IV 97-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  8. Mouraviev, Igor, 2006. "Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 672, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  9. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
  10. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 2003. "Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 227-250, August.
  11. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
  12. Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2008. "The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 165-168, August.
  13. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
  14. Tomala, Tristan, 1999. "Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 310-324, August.
  15. Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
  16. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
  17. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings, Econometric Society 736, Econometric Society.
  18. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1036, Econometric Society.
  19. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.

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