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Community Pressure for Green Behaviour

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Author Info

  • Anthony Heyes

    (University of Ottawa)

  • Sandeep Kapur

    (Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, Birkbeck)

Abstract

The desire to avoid rousing community hostility may encourage firms to behave in an environmentally responsible manner. It has been conjectured that such 'informal regulation' could effectively replace formal intervention in some settings, and usefully complement it in others. We explore these conjectures with mixed results. Informal regulation is necessarily less efficient than a well-designed formal alternative and the pattern of green behaviour induced by the threat of community hostility may increase or decrease welfare. The existence of community pressure may increase or decrease the optimal calibration of a formal intervention (in this case an environmental tax) and may complement or detract from the incentives generated by an optimally-calibrated tax.

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File URL: http://www.ems.bbk.ac.uk/research/wp/2012/PDFs/BWPEF1207.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics in its series Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance with number 1207.

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Date of creation: Apr 2012
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Handle: RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:1207

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Keywords: community pressure; informal regulation; compliance; enforcement;

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