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A Theory of Political Compromise

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Author Info

  • Dixit, A.
  • Grossmann, G.M.
  • Gul, F.

Abstract

We study a political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periode. In each pary the power has ultimate authority to devide the pie.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs in its series Papers with number 191.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:priwpu:191

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Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON NEW- JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
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Related research

Keywords: POLICY MAKING ; RISK ; GAME THEORY;

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Cited by:
  1. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  2. Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May.
  3. Humberto Llavador, 2001. "Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention," Economics Working Papers 571, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004.
  4. Dani Rodrik, 2000. "Participatory Politics, Social Cooperation, and Economic Stability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 140-144, May.

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