A Theory of Political Compromise
AbstractWe study a political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periode. In each pary the power has ultimate authority to devide the pie.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs in its series Papers with number 191.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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POLICY MAKING ; RISK ; GAME THEORY;
Other versions of this item:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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- Humberto Llavador, 2003.
"Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention,"
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- Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
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NBER Working Papers
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- Dani Rodrik, 2000. "Participatory Politics, Social Cooperation, and Economic Stability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 140-144, May.
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