Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A theory of political cycles

Contents:

Author Info

  • Leonardo Martinez

Abstract

We study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances. Policymakers' equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election. Typically, incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election (for a given reputation level), as argued in the political cycles literature, and these political cycles are less important when the policymaker's reputation is better. Our analysis sheds light on other agency relationships in which part of the compensation is decided upon infrequently.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/2005/wp_05-4r.cfm
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/2005/pdf/wp05-4.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number 05-04.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:05-04

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.richmondfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/

Related research

Keywords: Political science;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January.
  2. Gonzalez, Maria de los Angeles, 2002. "Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 204-24, June.
  3. Alesina, Alberto F & Roubini, Nouriel, 1990. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Kevin J. Stiroh, 2007. "Playing For Keeps: Pay And Performance In The Nba," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 145-161, 01.
  5. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  6. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
  7. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," Economics Working Papers 0047, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  8. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, December.
  9. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482 Elsevier.
  10. Murphy, K.J. & Gibbons, R., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence," Papers 90-09, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  11. Bernhardt, Dan & Dubey, Sangita & Hughson, Eric, 2004. "Term limits and pork barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2383-2422, December.
  12. Marina Azzimonti Renzo, 2004. "On the dynamic inefficiency of governments," 2004 Meeting Papers 228, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  13. Peltzman, Sam, 1990. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 27-63, April.
  14. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The economics of career concerns: part 2 :application to missions and accountability of government agencies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9641, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  15. Min Shi & Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 29, pages 67-76.
  16. Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," Discussion Papers 1387, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  17. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  18. Pettersson Lidbom, Per, 2003. "A Test of the Rational Electoral-Cycle Hypothesis," Research Papers in Economics 2003:16, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  19. Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September.
  20. Banks, J.S. & Sundaram, R.K., 1990. "Incumbents, Challengers, And Bandits: Bayesian Learning In A Dynamic Choice Model," RCER Working Papers 235, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  21. Torsten Persson, 2002. "Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 883-905, May.
  22. Reid, Bradford G, 1998. " Endogenous Elections, Electoral Budget Cycles and Canadian Provincial Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 35-48, October.
  23. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-98, August.
  24. Roubini, Nouriel & Alesina, Alberto, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Scholarly Articles 4553025, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  25. Panzer, John & Paredes, Ricardo D, 1991. " The Role of Economic Issues in Elections: The Case of the 1988 Chilean Presidential Referendum," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 51-59, August.
  26. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 183-98, January.
  27. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
  28. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
  29. Illoong Kwon, 2006. "Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 100-120, 03.
  30. Hess, Gregory D. & Orphanides, Athanasios, 2001. "Economic conditions, elections, and the magnitude of foreign conflicts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 121-140, April.
  31. Osvaldo Meloni, 1997. "Empleo, desempleo y elecciones, el caso de la elección presidencial Argentina de 1995," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 24(1 Year 19), pages 119-133, June.
  32. Peltzman, Sam, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-61, May.
  33. Bernhardt, Dan, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 315-39, April.
  34. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
  35. Eric Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2006. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 41-60, October.
  36. Steven A. Block & Karen E. Ferree & Smita Singh, 2003. "Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections and Political Business Cycles in Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 12(3), pages 444-468, September.
  37. Moritz Kraemer, 1997. "Electoral Budget Cycles in Latin America and the Caribbean: Incidence, Causes, and Political Futility," Research Department Publications 4084, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  38. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
  39. Oyer, Paul, 2000. "A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Liability and Rent Sharing," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 405-26, July.
  40. Moritz Kraemer, 1997. "Electoral Budget Cycles in Latin America and the Caribbean: Incidence, Causes, and Political Futility," IDB Publications 6802, Inter-American Development Bank.
  41. Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," Staff General Research Papers 11443, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  42. Eisenberg Daniel & Ketcham Jonathan, 2004. "Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections: Who Blames Whom for What," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-25, August.
  43. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 3352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  44. Gauti Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2005. "The politics of central bank independence: a theory of pandering and learning in government," Staff Reports 205, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  45. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2003. "Firms, assignments, and earnings," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 69-81.
  46. Block, Steven A., 2002. "Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 205-228, February.
  47. Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  48. Ray C. Fair, 1996. "Econometrics and Presidential Elections," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 89-102, Summer.
  49. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-34, December.
  50. Schuknecht, Ludger, 1996. "Political Business Cycles and Fiscal Policies in Developing Countries," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 155-70.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Camargo, Braz & Pastorino, Elena, 2012. "Career concerns: A human capital perspective," Textos para discussão 288, Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  2. Jacek Rothert, 2009. "Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Turnover," Department of Economics Working Papers 130124, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2012.
  3. Marina Azzimonti, 2011. "The dynamics of public investment under persistent electoral advantage," Working Papers 11-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  4. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2006. "Pork Barrel Cycles," NBER Working Papers 12190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Leonardo Martinez, 2009. "Why could political incentives be different during election times?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 315-334.
  6. Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2010. "Growth of Electoral Fraud in Non-Democracies: The Role of Uncertainty," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp420, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  7. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:05-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (William Perkins).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.