Why could political incentives be different during election times?
AbstractWhy could political incentives be different during election times? This article provides answers to this question using a career-concern model of political cycles. The analysis in the article is also relevant to understanding other agency relationships in which an important part of compensation is decided on infrequently.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its journal Economic Quarterly.
Volume (Year): (2009)
Issue (Month): Sum ()
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