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Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning versus Re-election Concerns

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Listed:
  • Lockwood, Ben
  • Le Borgne, Eric

Abstract

This Paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between officeholder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the officeholder?s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of their ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive ?re-election concerns? effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Lockwood, Ben & Le Borgne, Eric, 2004. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning versus Re-election Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 4664, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4664
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Political Uncertainty and Policy Innovation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(5), pages 779-805, December.
    2. Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "A theory of political cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1166-1186, May.
    3. Martinez Leonardo, 2009. "Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, May.
    4. Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Reputation and Career Concerns," 2006 Meeting Papers 853, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Career concerns; Elections; Citizen-candidate; Learning; Effort; Incomplete information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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