Reputation and Career Concerns
AbstractThis paper studies Holmstrom's  seminal model of career concerns, but considers that a small change in the beliefs about the agent's future productivity may imply a large change in his compensation---because, for example, the agent may be fired or promoted. This allows us to study how the agent's effort decision depends on his current reputation---with reputation we refer to the beliefs about the agent's future productivity. We shall show that the market's and the agent's problems can be written recursively. We find that the relationship between the agent's decisions and his current reputation is typically nonmonotonic: equilibrium effort is hump-shaped over reputation. Furthermore, equilibrium effort may be higher if there is less dispersion in the distribution of abilities; it may be higher later in the agent's career; and it may be higher than the efficient effort level
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2006 Meeting Papers with number 853.
Date of creation: 03 Dec 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
career concerns; reputation; agency; learning; dynamic games; promotions; firing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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Textos para discussÃ£o
288, Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
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- Andrew Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 79-91.
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